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Austin: Zero Waste

WHERE WILL ALL THE WASTE GO?:
UTILIZING EXTENDED PRODUCER
RESPONSIBILITY FRAMEWORK LAWS
TO ACHIEVE ZERO WASTE
ANTHONY A. AUSTIN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States has a waste problem. It represents only five
percent of the world population, yet it generates twenty-five to thirty
percent of the world’s waste. 1 In 2008, the United States generated 389.5
million tons of municipal solid waste (MSW). 2 As our economy and
population continue to grow, our waste will continue to grow as well. 3
The obvious dilemma is that all of this waste, the byproduct of our
economic advances, creates significant adverse environmental and public

*Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable Diana L. Terry, Colorado Court of Appeals. J.D., Golden Gate
University School of Law (2011); LL.M., Environmental and Natural Resources Law and Policy,
University of Denver Sturm College of Law (2012). The author would like to thank his wife,
Adrienne, colleague Luthien Niland, and Professor Justin Pidot for their endless support and
assistance throughout this entire process, as well as the Golden Gate University Environmental Law
Journal editorial board and Professor Ed Baskauskas for their much appreciated editing. The author
would also like to thank Professor Rock Pring for his encouragement and for making this article
possible. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent the
views of Judge Diana L. Terry or the Colorado Court of Appeals.
1
Robert Malone, World’s Worst Waste, FORBES.COM (May 24, 2006),
www.forbes.com/2006/05/23/waste-worlds-worst-cx_rm_0524waste.html; BRENDA PLATT ET AL.,
INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE, STOP TRASHING THE CLIMATE 1 (2008), available at
www.stoptrashingtheclimate.org/fullreport_stoptrashingtheclimate.pdf.
2
Rob van Haaren et al., 17th Nationwide Survey of MSW Management in the U.S.: The
State of Garbage in America, 47 BIOCYCLE 16, 16 (2010), available at
www.seas.columbia.edu/earth/wtert/sofos/SOG2010.pdf.
3
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901(a) (Westlaw 2013); Steffen Lehmann, Resource Recovery and
Materials Flow in the City: Zero Waste and Sustainable Consumption as Paradigms in Urban
Development, 11 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 28, 30 (2010).
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health effects when landfilled or incinerated. 4
This Article explores the use of extended producer responsibility
(EPR) laws to achieve the ultimate waste management goal: “zero
waste.” Zero waste is achieved through the complete diversion of MSW
from landfills and incinerators, resource conservation, and sustainable
product redesign. Historically, MSW has been dumped in landfills or
deposited in waste incinerators, practices that have allowed for robust
commerce and economic growth. However, these typical waste
management practices cause vast amounts of air, water, and soil
pollution, increased greenhouse gas emissions, and other adverse
environmental and public health issues associated with burying or
burning our garbage.
In response to these growing concerns, many cities and counties
across the country have instituted zero waste policies by using recycling
and composting and moving away from the common practices of burning
or burying their waste. San Francisco’s zero waste policy is hailed as the
most successful in the United States, with approximately seventy-seven
percent diversion from landfills or incinerators. 5 San Diego and Los
Angeles each divert about two thirds of their waste; Seattle diverts about
fifty-four percent. 6 Despite the growing number of cities adopting zero
waste policies, less than one quarter of all MSW generated in the United
States is recycled or composted. 7
Moreover, as cities strive toward achieving 100 percent diversion it
will become much more difficult to actually achieve complete waste
diversion. Design, cost, and technological impediments prevent complete
waste diversion. Recycling or composting the remaining products in the
waste stream is not possible due to product composition, the cost for
localities to bear, or the localities’ lack of technological ability to recover
all products in the waste stream. EPR laws, which require the remaining
products in the waste stream to be taken back by their producers and
require the producers to engage in mandated resource recovery, may
provide the solution to attaining the zero waste goals. This Article
proposes a hybrid approach, under which localities recycle and compost
to the maximum extent practicable, and an additional EPR framework
law targets the remaining products in the waste stream by requiring the
producers to take them back. This use of an EPR law in conjunction with
zero waste policies would have many environmental and public health
benefits.
4

Lehmann, supra note 3, at 29.
David Ferry, The Urban Quest for “Zero” Waste, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2011, at R7.
6
Id.
7
Van Haaren et al., supra note 2, at 20. This calculation is based on data from 2008.
5
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To best achieve these goals, an effective EPR approach must
contain certain adaptable elements. States have already been playing an
active role in adopting legislation to reduce waste and the various
externalities associated with its disposal. States should continue to be the
standard bearers in developing EPR framework laws. Any EPR law
should rely on an adaptable “framework” mechanism that allows the
state to more efficiently target products posing waste management,
public health, and environmental problems. Such a law should also
include mandatory resource recovery goals once the product is collected,
penalty and enforcement provisions, and vest decision-making authority
with the state’s selected agency as opposed to the state’s legislature.
Although no such state EPR law currently exists, the landscape of EPR
laws in the United States is changing rapidly. Generally, states target one
product per law, thereby requiring the legislature to pass a new law every
time a product causes waste management and environmental problems.
As of January 2013, thirty-two states have adopted seventy-five EPR
laws as part of their statewide waste management policies. 8 In 2010,
Maine became the first and only state in the nation to adopt a framework
law that, in contrast to the prevailing product-by-product approach,
utilizes an established set of factors to determine whether to include
products in its EPR take-back program. 9
Zero waste and EPR policies together can provide a solution to
managing and preventing our increasing amounts of waste. Part II of this
Article will explain how MSW is currently managed in the United States,
what exactly MSW is and how much we are discarding or incinerating,
as well as the environmental and public health impacts from our
increasing amounts of waste. Part III will introduce and discuss the zero
waste doctrine, its benefits, and the current status of zero waste policies
in the United States. Part IV will then present the doctrine of EPR, its
goals and purposes, and the necessary components of a successful EPR
framework law. Finally, Part V will propose recommendations for future
state EPR legislation and will also explore potential constitutional
challenges to such EPR laws, as well as federal EPR legislation as an
alternative.

8

Extended Producer Responsibility State Laws as of January 2013, PROD. STEWARDSHIP
INST., www.productstewardship.us/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=280 (last visited Jan.
2013).
9
See Press Release, Prod. Policy Inst., First State Producer Responsibility “Framework”
Law Passed in Maine with Unanimous Bi-Partisan and Chamber of Commerce Support (Mar. 25,
2010), available at www.productpolicy.org/ppi-press-release/first-state-producer-responsibilityframework-law-passed-maine-unanimous-bi-partis.
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AN OVERVIEW OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN THE UNITED
STATES

[Vol. 6

The United States disposes of a staggering amount of MSW,
despoiling the land, air, and water, while contributing to climate change.
State and local governments have taken the lead in reducing disposal
practices that cause these manifold problems. However, current policies
have not, and likely cannot, fully address all the issues. Even the most
aggressive efforts by municipalities to facilitate recycling and
composting fail to achieve complete diversion. 10
The EPA defines MSW as that which “we commonly use and throw
away,” including “everyday items such as product packaging, grass
clippings, furniture, clothing, bottles, food scraps, newspapers,
appliances, batteries, and tires.” 11 MSW in the United States is generally
10

This Article focuses on MSW and will not discuss the regulation or disposal of hazardous
waste, which is managed through cooperative federalism between states and the federal government
pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6921-6939F (Westlaw
2013). While some solid waste products such as batteries and electronics contain hazardous
materials, they will be included within the MSW group for the purposes of this Article. Other forms
of waste include construction and demolition waste, and industrial and agricultural waste. See Van
Haaren et al., supra note 2, at 17. This Article will not discuss these other forms of waste, because
most of the items that make up these other forms of waste do not lend themselves to being
redesigned, which is the focal point of the zero waste and EPR doctrines. Construction and
demolition waste includes concrete, wood, asphalt, gypsum, bricks, and salvaged building
components. See Construction and Demolition Materials, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
www.epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/industrial/cd/index.htm (last updated Nov. 15, 2012). Industrial waste is
waste comes from industrial and commercial processes and includes cement kiln dust, oil and natural
gas waste materials, fossil fuel combustion waste materials, mineral processing and mining waste
materials, and medical waste. See Industrial Waste, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
www.epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/industrial/index.htm (last updated Nov. 19, 2012).
The decision to focus only on MSW also stems from the fact that other studies, reports, and articles
discussing waste management in the United States do so by focusing on individual forms of waste,
particularly MSW. See, e.g., Van Haaren et al., supra note 2; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009 FACTS AND FIGURES (2010), available at
www.epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/municipal/pubs/msw2009rpt.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
2009 Facts and Figures]. Moreover, the focus of this Article is on two doctrinal policy tools—zero
waste and EPR—that currently focus on consumer products and other durable and nondurable goods
that generally make up MSW. See Product Stewardship and Extended Producer Responsibility:
STEWARDSHIP
INST.,
Definitions
and
Principles,
PROD.
productstewardship.us/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=231 (last visited May 13, 2012);
About EPR, PROD. POLICY INST., www.productpolicy.org/content/about-epr (last visited May 13,
2012); What Is Zero Waste, ECO-CYCLE, ecocycle.org/zerowaste#principles (last visited Jan. 2,
2013). Thus, it would be inconsistent to include other forms of waste that are not currently regulated
by these doctrines.
11
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2009 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 10, at 4; U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE GENERATION, RECYCLING, AND DISPOSAL IN THE
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managed at the state or local level 12 in one of three ways: disposed in
landfills, burned in waste-to-energy (WTE) combustion facilities, or
recycled or composted. 13 In 2008, the United States generated
approximately 389.5 million tons of MSW. 14
Approximately sixty-nine percent (270 million tons) was sent to
landfills, an estimated seven percent (almost 26 million tons) was
combusted in WTE facilities, and just over twenty-four percent (nearly
94 million tons) was recycled or composted (69 million tons were
recycled and 24.5 million tons were composted). 15
Durable goods (those that last three years or more, such as
appliances), non-durable goods (those that last less than three years, such

UNITED STATES: FACTS AND FIGURES FOR 2010, at 2 (2011), available at
www.epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/municipal/pubs/msw_2010_rev_factsheet.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 2010 Facts and Figures]. MSW does not always lend itself to a precise definition
depending on the materials contained therein. Some household solid wastes, for instance, can contain
hazardous materials and yet may still end up in MSW landfills with other MSW. See Solid Waste:
ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY
REGION
9,
Laws
and
Regulations,
U.S.
www.epa.gov/region9/waste/solid/laws.html#4 (last visited May 13, 2012).
12
See 39A C.J.S. Health & Environment § 169 (2003); 7 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 24:253 (3d ed. 2005).
13
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2009 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 10, at 11-16, 156169; Van Haaren et al., supra note 2, at 16.
14
Van Haaren et al., supra note 2, at 16-17. In separate studies, the EPA estimated that only
243 million tons of MSW was generated in 2009 and 250 million tons generated in 2010. U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2009 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 10, at 2; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
2010 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 1. In their article, The State of Garbage in America, Van
Haaren et al., explained the sizeable difference between the two estimates: “EPA estimates the
tonnage landfilled as the difference between its estimate of MSW generated minus its estimate of
what is sent to composting, recycling or WTE plants. The State of Garbage methodology, however,
is based purely on tons managed via all four methods in the responding states.” Van Haaren et al.,
supra note 2, at 22. In a recent report, Columbia University further explained the discrepancy
between the “State of Garbage” report and the EPA’s studies:
The only source of state-by-state [MSW] data is the Columbia/BioCycle ‘State of Garbage’
survey. It is based on detailed questionnaires sent to the waste management departments of
each state and subsequent analysis of these data. In 2008, the fifty states reported to the
Columbia/BioCycle survey that a total of 270 million tons of MSW was disposed in U.S.
landfills, while the EPA estimated . . . that only 136 million tons were landfilled in the same
year. It should be noted that the EPA departments dealing with greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions of waste management use the Columbia/BioCycle numbers.
N.J. THEMELIS ET AL., EARTH ENG’G CTR. OF COLUMBIA UNIV., ENERGY AND ECONOMIC VALUE OF
NON-RECYCLED PLASTICS (NRP) AND MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTES (MSW) THAT ARE CURRENTLY
LANDFILLED IN THE FIFTY STATES 9-10 (2011), available at jrnetsolserver.shorensteincente.netdnacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Report-from-Columbia-Universitys-Earth-EngineeringCenter.pdf. Therefore, the estimates from “The State of Garbage in America” of waste generated,
recycled, composted, and combusted will be used. However, the EPA’s detailed studies of MSW
composition characterized by material or by product categories will also be used because “The State
of Garbage in America” does not provide such analysis.
15
Van Haaren et al., supra note 2, at 19-20.
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as paper and plastic cups or plates), and containers and packaging 16
account for over seventy percent of the MSW generated; the remaining
amount consists mainly of organic waste. 17 Containers and packaging
make up the largest product source at approximately thirty percent, and
nondurable goods and durable goods make up twenty-two percent and
nineteen percent, respectively. 18 Containers and packaging are recycled
at the greatest rates among all product categories, at approximately fortyeight percent; nondurable goods and durable goods recovery rates are far
lower, at about thirty-six percent and eighteen-and-a-half percent,
respectively. 19 Nonetheless, overall recovery among all product
categories combined is a dismal thirty-four percent; the remaining sixtysix percent is sent to landfills or waste incineration facilities. 20 More
importantly, containers and packaging, nondurable goods, and durable
goods make up almost sixty-nine percent of the MSW landfilled or
combusted, which further illustrates the opportunity to significantly
reduce the disposal of these products through zero waste and EPR
policies. 21
Generally, state and local governments manage waste recovery and
disposal. They regulate the licensing of waste disposal facilities; the
collection, storage, and disposal of waste; landfill closures; and waste
incineration. 22 States or localities also establish waste management plans,
require the use of certain waste facilities or permits for the operation of
such facilities, order cleanup measures, prohibit open dumping, establish
just and equitable rates for waste collection and disposal, require
mandatory recycling, and ban the sale of certain beverage containers. 23
This regulatory regime is a main reason why EPR laws have continued at
the state level, rather than the federal level.
Generating MSW and then landfilling or burning that waste creates
numerous adverse environmental, public health, and land use effects. 24
16

U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2009 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 10, at 66. Typically,
MSW is characterized by material type or product type. Id. at 34. Materials constituting MSW
include paper and paperboard, glass, metals, plastics, rubber and leather, textiles, wood, and other
organic wastes (such as food scraps and yard trimmings). Id. at 36. Products that make up MSW are
categorized into durable goods, nondurable goods, containers and packaging, and food scraps and
yard trimmings. Id. at 66, 68.
17
Id. at 68; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2010 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 6.
18
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2009 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 10, at 68; U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, 2010 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 6.
19
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2010 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 7.
20
Id. at 7-8.
21
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2009 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 10, at 74, 83, 94.
22
39A C.J.S. Health & Environment, supra note 12, § 169; 7 MCQUILLIN, supra note 12, §
24:253.
23
39A C.J.S. Health & Environment, supra note 12, § 169.
24
See Lehmann, supra note 3, at 28-30; PLATT ET AL., supra note 1, at 4-7.
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These consequences include water, soil, and air pollution, as well as
various land use, climate change, and resources issues that are
inextricably connected to unsustainable production and consumption
practices. 25 Moreover, these effects are negative externalities associated
with the manufacture, purchase, use, collection, and disposal of goods
and products: costs that are not borne by the consumer (in the price of the
product) or the producer (in the cost of making and selling the product),
but instead are externalized onto society in general. 26
For example, it was only twenty-five years ago that the EPA
conducted a study of solid waste management in the United States and
found that more than 500 MSW facilities violated groundwater
standards, 845 violated air quality standards, and 660 were the source of
surface water contamination. 27 The findings resulted, in part, in the
strengthening of EPA’s role in managing MSW through the Hazardous
and Solid Waste Amendments to the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA). 28 Nonetheless, despite the more stringent
requirements governing solid waste disposal facilities, landfill runoff and
leachate, which contains a variety of hazardous and poisonous chemicals,
continue to pose a threat to soil and groundwater. 29
In addition, disposing of the vast majority of our MSW through
landfilling and incineration emits substantial amounts of air pollutants
and climate change-causing greenhouse gases. In the United States,
landfills are the third largest source of methane—a greenhouse gas that is
twenty-one times more potent than carbon dioxide 30 —emitting 117.5
teragrams of carbon dioxide equivalent (TgCO2Eq) in 2009, 31 which is
25

See Lehmann, supra note 3, at 28-30; PLATT ET AL., supra note 1, at 4-7.
See Noah Sachs, Planning the Funeral at the Birth: Extended Producer Responsibility in
the European Union and the United States, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 55-62 (2006); Daniel
Shean, The Politics of Trash, 16 BUFF. ENVTL. L. J. 55, 70-77 (2008-2009); William J. Cantrell,
Cleaning Up the Mess: United Haulers, The Dormant Commerce Clause, and Transaction Costs
Economics, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 149, 176 (2009).
27
Paula C. Murray & David B. Spence, Fair Weather Federalism and America’s Waste
Disposal Crisis, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 71, 74 (2003); Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 53
Fed. Reg. 33,314, 33,319 (Aug. 30, 1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257 and 258).
28
Murray & Spence, supra note 27, at 74; Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984).
29
Lehmann, supra note 3, at 28; G. FRED LEE & ANNE JONES-LEE, SOLID WASTE
MANAGEMENT: U.S. EPA LINED-LANDFILL APPROACH NOT RELIABLE FOR PROTECTING PUBLIC
HEALTH
AND
ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY
6
(2011),
available
at
www.gfredlee.com/Landfills/Comblandfillsupdate.pdf.
30
Greenhouse
Gas
Properties,
U.S.
ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY,
www.epa.gov/outreach/scientific.html (last updated June 22, 2010).
31
One teragram is equal to one million metric tons. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2009, at ES-3 (2011), available
at
www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2011Complete_Report.pdf.
26
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approximately seventeen percent of the total U.S. anthropogenic methane
emissions. 32 The EPA has found that methane emissions have been
increasing over the last decade and further anticipates that the total
amount of MSW generated will continue to increase as the population
grows. 33 Additionally, waste incineration at WTE facilities emits
substantial amounts of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrogen oxides. 34
In 2009, MSW combustion emitted 12.7 TgCO2Eq; burning plastics
accounted for approximately half of those emissions. 35 Moreover, WTE
facilities emit more carbon dioxide per megawatt hour than coal-fired,
oil-fired, or natural-gas-fired power plants. 36 Lastly, when viewed
throughout the entire life cycle, from extraction of resources, production,
use, and disposal, products and packaging are associated with forty-four
percent of U.S. greenhouse gases. 37 Burning waste in WTE facilities also
emits significant amounts of other air pollutants, such as mercury, lead,
nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, particulate matter, volatile organic
compounds, and dioxins. 38
Furthermore, creating products that ultimately end up in landfills or
are burned in WTE facilities requires large amounts of energy and raw
natural resources. For example, in 2006, U.S. citizens purchased
approximately 31.2 billion liters of water, which was sold in plastic
bottles, requiring 900,000 tons of plastic. 39 In addition, “oil and natural
32

Id. at 8-1, 8-2.
Id. at 8-3.
34
Id. at 3-34.
35
Id.
36
Burning MSW in WTE facilities emits 2,988 lbs/megawatt-hour (MWh) of carbon
dioxide; burning coal emits 2,249 lbs/MWh of carbon dioxide, burning oil emits 1,672 lbs/MWh of
carbon dioxide, and burning natural gas emits 1,135 lbs/MWh of carbon dioxide. Clean Energy: Air
Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/airemissions.html (last updated Oct. 17, 2012); PLATT ET AL., supra note 1, at 9. Proponents of WTE,
however, argue that carbon dioxide emissions from WTE facilities are much lower because biomassbased emissions are part of the Earth’s natural carbon cycle and, therefore, do not contribute to a net
increase in carbon dioxide emissions. See SOLID WASTE ASS’N OF N. AM., COMPARISON OF AIR
EMISSIONS FROM WASTE-TO-ENERGY FACILITIES TO FOSSIL FUEL POWER PLANTS 6, at n.8 (2006),
available at www.metrovancouver.org/services/solidwaste/planning/ReportsforQA/SWANA.pdf.
37
JOSHUAH STOLAROFF, PROD. POLICY INST., PRODUCTS, PACKAGING AND U.S.
GREENHOUSE
GAS
EMISSIONS
5
(2009),
available
at
www.productpolicy.org/ppi/attachments/PPI_Climate_Change_and_Products_White_Paper_Septem
ber_2009.pdf. This statistic includes the impacts from producing products abroad and consuming
them in the United States.
38
ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT, WASTE-TO-ENERGY: DIRTYING MARYLAND’S AIR BY
SEEKING A QUICK FIX ON RENEWABLE ENERGY? 2-7 (2011); Clean Energy: Municipal Solid Waste,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/municipal-sw.html
(last updated Oct. 17, 2012).
39
Bottled
Water
and
Energy:
A
Fact
Sheet,
PAC.
INST.,
www.pacinst.org/topics/water_and_sustainability/bottled_water/bottled_water_and_energy.html
(last visited May 13, 2012).
33
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gas are the major raw materials used to produce plastics,” 40 and
producing these plastic bottles required 106 billion megajoules of energy,
the equivalent of seventeen million barrels of oil. 41 Moreover, making
one liter of bottled water requires three liters of water. 42 Another
illustration is the plastic bag, of which approximately 100 billion are
used each year in the United States, requiring twelve million barrels of
oil to produce. 43
Lastly, the current model of landfilling massive amounts of MSW is
unsustainable. As of 2009, there are 1,908 landfills in operation in the
United States, 44 and although the number of landfills has decreased, their
overall size has increased. 45 In light of the ever-growing amount of
waste, cities and states all over the country are running out of landfill
space. For instance, San Francisco may run out of landfill space by
2014. 46 Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island each have
about twelve years of capacity remaining. 47 New York has about twentyfive years left. 48
III. EXPLORING ZERO WASTE POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES
In exercising their waste management authority, many cities and
counties have implemented zero waste policies as a means of fully
diverting solid waste away from landfills and incinerators. Most, if not
all, of these policies have included aggressive recycling and composting
programs. However, those programs do not appear to be able to achieve
complete waste diversion.
A.

ZERO WASTE DEFINED

The most basic concept of zero waste can be synthesized into one
simple notion: that all solid waste should be diverted from landfills and

40

Lifecycle
of
a
Plastic
Product,
AM.
CHEMISTRY
COUNCIL,
plastics.americanchemistry.com/Life-Cycle#top (last visited May 13, 2012).
41
PAC. INST., supra note 39.
42
Id.
43
Jennie Reilly Romer, Comment, The Evolution of San Francisco’s Plastic-Bag Ban, 1
GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L. J. 439, 442-43 (2007).
44
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2009 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 10, at 168.
45
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2010 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 10.
46
Lehmann, supra note 3, at 29.
47
See Van Haaren et al., supra note 2, at 20; Brian Palmer, Go West, Garbage Can!, SLATE
(Feb.
15,
2011),
www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/the_green_lantern/2011/02/go_west_garbage_can.single
.html.
48
Palmer, supra note 47.
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incinerators. 49 In its practical application, zero waste has become a
policy goal of diverting 100 percent of solid waste, in particular waste
from end-of-life materials and products, from landfills or incinerators
through product reuse, recycling, and composting. 50 Zero waste also
incorporates principles of sustainable product design and manufacturing,
as well as other waste reduction tools to work toward a future in which
waste is completely eliminated. 51 As a doctrine, zero waste can include
elements of EPR, such as making the manufacturer responsible for a
product’s entire lifecycle and ultimately redesigning the product to be
more recyclable or reusable. 52
However, the doctrine is not solely about recycling or composting,
and cannot be about total waste elimination either given technological
limitations. In light of these two aspects, which encompass several waste
management and reduction tools, the ultimate goals of a zero waste
policy include waste diversion, resource conservation, and product
redesign. These goals will be highlighted further when exploring the vital
elements of a successful EPR law, which can ultimately serve as the
means of achieving those goals by filling in the gaps where a city’s zero
waste policy falls short. 53
B.

CURRENT WASTE DIVERSION AND RESOURCE CONSERVATION
PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES

Cities and counties that have adopted zero waste policies are largely
focused on waste diversion. Two readily available tools to achieve waste
diversion are recycling and composting. 54 Recycling and composting our
49

S.F.
Dep’t
of
the
Env’t,
Zero
Waste,
SFENVIRONMENT.ORG,
www.sfenvironment.org/zero-waste (last visited Dec. 28, 2012).
50
See generally id.; Waste Reduction Best Practices, GREEN CITIES CALIFORNIA.ORG,
www.greencitiescalifornia.org/best-practices/waste-reduction/index.html (last updated Sept. 1,
2009).
51
ECO-CYCLE, supra note 10.
52
Id.
53
See Lehmann, supra note 3, at 31.
54
Although composting is similar to landfilling in the very limited sense that both involve
storing waste on land, composting is different in at least one significant respect. With the
composting process a beneficial and valuable end product is created—compost—that is used as a
“nutrient-rich soil amendment capable of improving depleted or disturbed soil environments.” Cal.
Dep’t of Res. Recycling and Recovery, Organic Material Management Compost—What Is It?,
CALRECYCLE, www.calrecycle.ca.gov/organics/compostmulch/CompostIs.htm#Important (last
updated May 5, 2006). In addition to improving soil conditions, composting reduces GHG emissions
and reduces the need for water, fertilizer, pesticides, and herbicides—all benefits that landfilling
does not provide. See id.; Composting, Environmental Benefits, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
www.epa.gov/compost/benefits.htm (last updated Nov. 16, 2012); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS THROUGH RECYCLING AND COMPOSTING 11 (2011),
available
at
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MSW has numerous environmental benefits and can serve as a source of
job creation and local revenue generation. 55 First, the United States’ total
recycling and composting efforts in 2010 saved more than 1.3 quadrillion
BTUs 56 of energy, equivalent to more than 229 million barrels of oil. 57 In
particular, recycling requires significantly less energy than does mining,
extracting, and manufacturing virgin resources. 58 In his article on
resource recovery and zero waste policies, Dr. Steffen Lehmann found
that “there is a ninety-five percent energy saving when using secondary
(recycled) aluminum; eighty-five percent for copper; eighty percent for
plastics; seventy-four percent for steel; and sixty-four percent for
paper.” 59 Moreover, recovery through product recycling curbs not just
the level of MSW generated, but the level of other discards as well. In a
joint report, the Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Eco-Cycle, and the
Global Anti-Incinerator Alliance found that “[f]or every ton of discarded
products and materials destroyed by incinerators and landfills, about
[seventy-one] tons of manufacturing, mining, oil and gas exploration,
agricultural, coal combustion, and other discards are produced.” 60
Recycling also reduces air and water pollution that would arise from the
mining and extraction of virgin materials. 61
Second, recycling and composting leads to reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions. In addition to saving energy, the total amount of MSW
recycled and composted in 2010 amounted to a reduction of more than
186 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MMTCO2Eq),

www.epa.gov/region10/pdf/climate/wccmmf/Reducing_GHGs_through_Recycling_and_Compostin
g.pdf; Sally Brown et al., Greenhouse Gas Balance for Composting Operations, 37 J. ENVTL.
QUALITY 1396, 1396-97 (2008); Sally Brown & Scott Subler, Composting and Greenhouse Gas
Emissions: A Producer’s Perspective, 48 BIOCYCLE 37 (2007).
55
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
THROUGH MATERIALS AND LAND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 8 (2009); Matt Ewadinger & Scott
Mouw, Recycling Creates Jobs and Boosts Economy, 46 BIOCYCLE 43 (2005), available at
www.biocycle.net/2005/10/recycling-creates-jobs-and-boosts-economy/.
56
British
Thermal
Unit,
ENCYCLOPÆDIA
BRITANNICA,
www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/80372/British-thermal-unit-BTU (last visited May 13, 2012).
57
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2010 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 6. However, it is
likely that the actual amounts are higher; these figures are based on the EPA’s estimation that only
85 million tons of MSW were recycled or composted in 2010. As explained above, supra note 14, a
study conducted by BioCycle and Columbia University estimated that the United States generated
389.5 million tons of waste and recycled or composted 94 million tons. Van Haaren et al., supra note
2, at 20. Therefore, 94 million tons of MSW recycled or composted likely resulted in more than 1.3
quadrillion BTUs of energy saved.
58
Lehmann, supra note 3, at 32.
59
Id.; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WASTEWISE (2010), available at
www.epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/municipal/pubs/msw_2010_rev_factsheet.pdf.
60
PLATT ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
61
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2010 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 10; U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, supra note 55, at 8.
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which achieves the same carbon reduction as would taking thirty-six
million cars off the road. 62 In their recent study, Stop Trashing the
Climate, which analyzed zero waste strategies as a means of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions, the Institute for Local Self-Reliance, the
Global Anti-Incinerator Alliance, and Eco-Cycle found that “preventing
waste and expanding reuse, recycling, and composting programs—that
is, aiming for zero waste—is one of the fastest, cheapest, and most
effective strategies available for combating climate change.” 63 Moreover,
the EPA has concluded that increasing recycling and composting rates to
100 percent—thereby achieving complete MSW diversion—would
equate to a reduction of 300 MMTCO2Eq per year. 64
While complete waste diversion may not be currently achievable, it
is a target for cities and counties to aim for in their pursuit of increasing
waste diversion, resource conservation, and an overall closed-loop
economy.
Of the 389.5 million tons of MSW generated in 2008, only twentyfour percent, or ninety-four million tons, was recycled or composted,
leaving the rest to be landfilled or incinerated. 65 While these figures are
national, recycling and composting rates vary by city, state, and region.
The western United States region (California, Nevada, Oregon, and
Washington) has the highest rate of recycling and composting, at fortysix percent. 66 Conversely, the Rocky Mountain region (Arizona,
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming) has the
lowest rate, at only eleven percent. 67 The Midwest, New England, and
Mid-Atlantic regions recycle and compost at a rate of twenty-two to
twenty-nine percent. 68 Nonetheless, even with the western states’
recycling and composting efforts, these rates are not high enough to stop
the adverse environmental effects of landfilling and incinerating.
In response to the adverse environmental and public health effects
62

U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2010 FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 4. The same
logical assumption governing an increase in the amount of energy saved applies here as well, for the
reasons explained in footnote 57. While the composting process is a very minor source of methane,
volatile organic compounds, and ammonia, its environmental benefits (overall methane and other
GHG emission reductions from landfill diversion; enhanced carbon sequestration by the soil; and a
reduced need for water, fertilizers and pesticides) greatly outweigh its costs. See Compost Emissions
Work Group, CAL. AIR RES. BD., www.arb.ca.gov/cc/compost/compost.htm (last updated Dec. 21,
2011); Composting, Environmental Benefits; Composting, Environmental Benefits, supra note 54;
REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS THROUGH RECYCLING AND COMPOSTING, supra note 54,
at 10-11; Brown et al. supra note 54, at 1396-97; Brown & Subler, supra note 54, at 37.
63
PLATT ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
64
U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, supra note 55, at 22, box 6.
65
Van Haaren et al., supra note 2, at 20.
66
Id. at 16, 20.
67
Id.
68
Id.
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discussed above, dozens of cities throughout the United States are
seriously addressing the growing MSW problem. For example, thirty-six
U.S. city mayors have joined eighty other city mayors from all over the
world in signing the United Nations Environmental Accords. 69 The
Environmental Accords are a set of objectives aimed at creating an
“ecologically sustainable, economically dynamic, and socially equitable
future.” 70 Three of the objectives are aimed at waste reduction, with one
specifically calling for signatory cities to establish a zero waste goal and
achieve complete MSW diversion by 2040. 71 Accordingly, several U.S.
cities have enacted zero waste goals, including Oakland, California; San
Francisco, California; San Jose, California; and Seattle, Washington. 72
Several other localities that are not signatories to the Environmental
Accords, such as Boulder County, Colorado, and Alameda, California,
have proactively adopted zero waste goals as well. 73
No two zero waste goals, however, are the same. Each goal has
different benchmarks and different deadlines for achieving waste
diversion. Furthermore, some cities and counties are close to reaching
their respective goals, as shown by San Francisco’s progress in
approaching eighty percent diversion through recycling and composting
efforts alone. 74 San Francisco takes credit for having the most stringent
zero waste goal and the greatest rate of MSW diversion in the United
States. The city currently diverts at seventy-seven percent. 75 It met its
2010 benchmark of seventy-five percent diversion and is now working

69

S.F. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T.,URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS SIGNING CITIES (2011),
available
at
www.sfenvironment.org/sites/default/files/editoruploads/initiatives/uea_List_of_signing_Cities.pdf.
70
See
URBAN
ENVIRONMENTAL
ACCORDS
(2005),
available
at
www.sfenvironment.org/sites/default/files/editoruploads/initiatives/uea_Urban_Environmental_Accords.pdf.
71
Id.
72
S.F. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T., supra note 69; Oakland, Cal., Res. 79774 C.M.S. (Mar. 7,
2006), available at clerkwebsvr1.oaklandnet.com/attachments/13137.pdf; S.F., Cal., Res. 679-02
(Sept. 30, 2002), available at www.sfbos.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/bdsupvrs/resolutions02/r0679-02.pdf;
San
Jose,
Cal.,
Res.
74077
(Oct.
30,
2007),
available
at
www3.sanjoseca.gov/clerk/ORDS_RESOS/RESO_74077.pdf; Seattle, Wash., Res. 30990 (July 16,
2007), available at clerk.seattle.gov/~archives/Resolutions/Resn_30990.pdf.
73
BOULDER CITY COUNCIL, A RESOLUTION DECLARING BOULDER A ZERO WASTE
COMMUNITY
(May
2,
2006),
available
at
ecocycle.org/files/pdfs/ARESOLUTIONDECLARINGBOULDERAZEROWASTECOMMUNITY.
pdf; Boulder County, Colo., Res. 2010-143, (Dec. 9, 2010), available at
www.bouldercounty.org/doc/sustainability/zerowasteresolution2010.pdf; CITY OF ALAMEDA, ZERO
WASTE
IMPLEMENTATION
PLAN,
at
ES-1
(2010),
available
at
www.cityofalamedaca.gov/getdoc.cfm?id=5700.
74
Ferry, supra note 5; S.F. Dep’t of the Env’t, supra note 49.
75
Ferry, supra note 5; S.F. Dep’t of the Env’t, supra note 49.
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toward its 2020 zero waste goal of 100 percent. 76 The cost for residential
waste collection in San Francisco is $27.55 per month, which is the cost
for the black “garbage” container alone; the blue recycling and green
composting containers are provided at no cost. 77 If a resident can reduce
his or her landfill waste to fit into a smaller, twenty-gallon garbage
container, then the cost is reduced to $21.21 per month. 78 San Francisco
has also enacted an ordinance mandating recycling and composting by all
persons, firms, businesses, associations, corporations, and government
entities in the city. 79 Seattle, on the other hand, currently diverts about
fifty-four percent of its MSW; although this is a laudable and necessary
effort, this rate misses its 2012 benchmark of sixty percent diversion
(Seattle’s ultimate goal is seventy percent diversion by 2025). 80
Despite these growing local efforts, the current zero waste goals
alone are not enough to address the growing MSW problem in the United
States. Even with these goals in place, San Francisco is the only city
close to achieving complete diversion. Additionally, some cities do not
even consider their zero waste goals to mean actual “zero” waste.
Instead, these cities rely on the definition from the Zero Waste
International Alliance, which considers ninety percent diversion to be
zero waste. 81
The larger issue, though, is that not all products that make up our
MSW are capable of being recycled or composted by local governments.
While ninety percent waste diversion is certainly a reasonably attainable
goal for cities like San Francisco, 82 the looming question is how to divert
the remaining ten (or fifteen or twenty) percent. One solution proposed
by many city officials is to incinerate the remaining amount in WTE
facilities. 83 However, this option overlooks the fact that zero waste
means diversion from not only landfills, but incinerators as well.
Furthermore, despite state-of-the-art emission control systems, 84
combusting MSW in WTE facilities still emits significant amounts of air
pollutants, including mercury, lead, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide,

76

Ferry, supra note 5; S.F. Dep’t of the Env’t, supra note 49.
Residential Rates, RECOLOGY, www.sunsetscavenger.com/residentialRates.htm (last
visited May 12, 2012).
78
Id.
79
S.F., Cal., Ordinance 100-09 (June 9, 2009).
80
Ferry, supra note 5; Seattle, Wash., Res. No. 30990 (July 16, 2007).
81
Ferry, supra note 5; see Zero Waste Definition, ZERO WASTE INT’L ALLIANCE,
zwia.org/standards/zw-definition/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2013).
82
See Ferry, supra note 5.
83
Id.
84
Elisabeth Rosenthal, Europe Finds Clean Energy in Trash, but U.S. Lags, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/04/13/science/earth/13trash.html.
77
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particulate matter, volatile organic compounds, and dioxins. 85 Looking to
WTE facilities as a solution also fails to address the issue of resource
conservation, because these facilities incinerate valuable materials that
could instead be recycled into new products. 86 Thus, burning the
remaining MSW is not an optimal solution.
Because traditional waste management techniques are failing and
WTE cannot address the adverse environmental and public health effects
or the resource conservation and product redesign goals, another solution
is necessary. EPR laws have the potential to close that gap on the
remaining MSW that cannot be composted or recycled through local
efforts. EPR laws are a growing trend in the United States 87 and they
operate as a means of realizing complete waste diversion from landfills
and incinerators, resource conservation, and product redesign, which
help move toward a more sustainable society in the process.
IV. ACHIEVING ZERO WASTE THROUGH EXTENDED PRODUCER
RESPONSIBILITY
Cities and counties currently utilize recycling and composting
measures in order to divert as much MSW from landfills or incinerators
as possible. However, while absolutely necessary, these efforts are not
enough. In looking to the future, a hybrid approach should be adopted,
whereby local governments (or third-party waste management companies
hired by localities) continue to recycle and compost to the greatest extent
practicable, and once those efforts are exhausted, EPR laws would
address those products that remain in the waste stream. EPR laws, when
designed to force the producer to take back a product at the end of its life
and engage in resource recovery, can close the gap on the remaining
MSW that cannot feasibly be recycled, composted, or reused.
While such a role of EPR or product stewardship would rely further
on city and county waste collection services, this approach is consistent
with the current recycling and composting practices of many local
85

ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT, supra note 38, at 2-7; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra

note 38.
86

Ferry, supra note 5.
Letter from Scott Cassel, Exec. Dir. & Founder, Prod. Stewardship Inst., to Assemb.
Member Nancy Skinner, Chair, Cal. Assemb. Comm. on Natural Res., Support for Assembly Bill
283
(Apr.
14,
2009),
available
at
www.productstewardship.us/associations/6596/files/PSI%20support%20for%20CA%20AB%20283
%20framework%20bill%20%204-14-09.pdf; Letter from Scott Cassel, Exec. Dir. & Founder, Prod.
Stewardship Inst., to Rep. Ben Cannon, Chairman, Or. House Env’t and Water Comm., Support for
House
Bill
3060
(Mar.
31,
2009),
available
at
www.productstewardship.us/associations/6596/files/PSI%20support%20for%20OR%20HB%20306
0%20framework%20bill%203-31-09.pdf.
87
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governments. Certainly, expanding recycling and composting efforts to
the greatest extent possible will have costs, and each locality will have to
determine what is feasible given these costs and the technology required
for increased resource recovery. Still, cities like San Francisco have
shown that getting to eighty percent or more of MSW diversion simply
through recycling and composting practices is possible.
A.

DEFINING EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY

EPR take-back laws work by requiring the producers of products
that cause waste management, public health, environmental, and other
adverse issues to take back their products at the end of the products’
lives. The main concept is that the responsibility and costs of managing,
recycling, and disposing of a particular product is to be borne by the
producer of that product, rather than society. The theoretical
underpinning of EPR take-back laws is that by requiring the producer to
take responsibility—both financial and physical—for the product, the
internalization of these costs by the producer should serve as an incentive
for the producer to redesign the product to be more recyclable,
compostable, and or reusable—in other words, more sustainable. 88 This
logic is a purely economic, market-based approach that arises from the
desire, or need, to internalize those product externalities, such as the cost
of waste disposal and the associated environmental and health impacts,
with the producer. 89 In addition to potentially curing such market
failures, EPR laws also help achieve waste diversion and resource
conservation. 90
88

See STEPHEN SMITH, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
EVALUATING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY
PROGRAMMES
7-8
(2005),
search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?doclanguage=en&cote=env/epoc/wgwpr(2
005)6/final; PROD. STEWARDSHIP INST, supra note 8; About EPR, PROD. POLICY INST.,
www.productpolicy.org/content/about-epr (last visited May 10, 2012); Extended Producer
Responsibility, INFORM, www.informinc.org/pages/research/waste-prevention/extended-producerresponsibility.html (last visited May 10, 2012).
89
See Sachs, supra note 26, at 56-57; Hannah McCrea, Note, Germany’s “Take-Back”
Approach to Waste Management: Is There a Legal Basis for Adoption in the United States?, 23 GEO.
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 513, 515-17 (2011).
90
A related doctrine, known as product stewardship, shares most of the EPR elements.
However, they differ in one major regard: traditionally, EPR laws provided that only the producers
should bear the responsibility and costs of managing their products at the end of life. Product
stewardship laws, on the other hand, impose responsibility on all those involved in the life of the
product: producers, retailers, and consumers. See Product Stewardship and Extended Producer
STEWARDSHIP
INST.,
Responsibility:
Definitions
and
Principles,
PROD.
productstewardship.us/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=231 (last visited May 15, 2012). In
part due to their doctrinal similarities, the growing trend is to use the terms EPR and “product
stewardship” interchangeably. See Garth Hickle, The Evolving Product Stewardship Policy
FOR
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Because management of MSW in the United States is traditionally
undertaken by cities and states, and because there has been a lack of
federal action in this area, states have taken the lead in addressing the
MSW problem through innovative EPR laws. As of January 2013, thirtytwo states have enacted seventy-five EPR laws. 91 Among these laws,
nine product categories are regulated: mercury-filled automobile
switches, batteries, carpet, cell phones, electronics, fluorescent lighting,
mercury thermostats, paint, and pesticide containers. 92 However, no state
regulates all nine categories, and most states regulate only one or two. 93
In addition to these nine, several other product categories have been
introduced in state legislation across the United States in the last three
years, including mattresses, medical sharps, smoke detectors, packaging,
and pharmaceutical drugs. 94
In his article discussing the success of EPR legislation in the
European Union, Professor Noah Sachs provides a critique of EPR, and
in so doing brings attention to two of its goals: full cost internalization
and the subsequent product redesign. While Professor Sachs does not
dispute the “downstream impacts” of EPR—that EPR reduces the
volume of waste to be landfilled or incinerated, thereby diverting toxic
chemicals from the waste stream, and also reduces the pressure on
extracting virgin resources—he argues that EPR is not always successful
in accomplishing the “upstream impacts,” thus forcing the cost
internalization and subsequent redesign of certain products. 95 He
explains that in order to have true cost internalization, and therefore
incentive to redesign, a producer must have “individual responsibility”
over its own products instead of “collective responsibility,” under which
the entire industry shares in the costs of taking back the product. 96
However, individual responsibility, he argues, faces large transactional
costs and thus is not feasible. 97 He further concludes that collective
responsibility, which is what most European EPR laws utilize, fails to

Landscape in the United States: A State Perspective 1, at the ABA Section of Environment, Energy,
and Resources Section Fall Meeting (Oct. 13, 2011); PROD. POLICY INST., PROD. STEWARDSHIP
INST. & CAL. PROD. STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, PROD. STEWARDSHIP AND EXTENDED PRODUCER
RESPONSIBILITY: DEFINITIONS AND PRINCIPLES (2012), available at www.calpsc.org/admindocument-upload/doc_download/11-ppi-psi-cpsc-epr-principles.
91
PROD. STEWARDSHIP INST., supra note 8.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Extended Producer Responsibility Legislation as of December 31, 2012, PROD.
STEWARDSHIP INST., productstewardship.us/associations/6596/files/PSActiveLegislation2012.cfm.
95
Sachs, supra note 26, at 63-65.
96
Id. at 75-76.
97
Id. at 76.
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effectuate true cost internalization and product redesign. 98 Though
Professor Sachs accurately concludes that EPR is able to achieve waste
diversion and resource conservation, his argument that EPR laws are
unable to achieve cost internalization and product redesign presents only
one view and is arguably incorrect. It is also important to note that
Professor Sachs’s article came out in 2006, before most of the EPR laws
in the United States were passed. Hence, it is too soon to see a direct link
between EPR and product redesign in the United States.
There is evidence of a direct link between EPR laws and redesign in
other countries. The International Institute for Industrial Environmental
Economics at Lund University has concluded that, in practice, individual
responsibility is feasible and that EPR laws have proven to be successful
in internalizing costs and incentivizing redesign. 99 The Institute’s report
on the matter concludes, as did Professor Sachs, that individual producer
responsibility is necessary to achieve true cost internalization and
product redesign. 100 However, unlike Professor Sachs, the Institute
presents empirical evidence that “unequivocally illustrates that
manufacturers have designed their products to meet anticipated and
existing demands from EPR.” 101 As a direct consequence of EPR laws
employing individual producer responsibility, electronics and car
manufacturers in Sweden and Japan have taken concrete measures to
reduce the amount of materials used, prolong the products’ or cars’ lives,
ease the disassembly or separation of the products, reduce the use of
hazardous substances, enhance component and material re-use, and
increase the recyclability of materials. 102 Lastly, while the Institute’s
report maintains that individual producer responsibility is vital, it also
suggests that producers may be allowed to choose to collectively
organize take-back and recycling systems so long as each producer
maintains individual financial responsibility 103 for its own new
products. 104
In addition to his theory about the success of EPR laws, Professor
Sachs also accurately highlights the importance of achieving product
redesign in measuring the success and necessity of EPR laws. He poses

98

Id. at 76-77.
CHRIS VAN ROSSEM ET AL., INT’L INST. FOR INDUS. ENVTL. ECONS., EXTENDED
PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY: AN EXAMINATION OF ITS IMPACT ON INNOVATION AND GREENING
PRODUCTS (2006).
100
Id. at 6-7.
101
Id. at 14.
102
Id. at 14-15, 19-20.
103
Financial responsibility is defined in the report as the producer covering all or part of the
costs for the collection, recycling, or final disposal of its products. Id. at 2.
104
Id. at 25.
99
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the question, “If EPR is similar to other recycling programs in achieving
downstream impacts and resource benefits, then what is the added value
of producer responsibility?” 105 In other words, why require the
producers, and not some other entity or government agency, to take back
their products? The answer is that only the producer designs and
manufactures the product, and thus only the producer has the ability to
redesign the product to be more sustainable. 106 Moreover, even in the
absence of actual redesign, shifting costs back to the producers will
likely have an effect on price and thus consumer demand for those
regulated products. Therefore, while the market elasticity of demand for
the product will indeed play a role, 107 EPR may still be able to eliminate
negative externalities and optimize the purchase of products despite the
doctrine’s arguable inability to effectuate product redesign.
B.

THE ELEMENTS OF EPR

Presented below is a discussion of five concepts or mechanisms that
are part of current EPR laws and the framework for EPR legislation: the
product selection mechanism, the product take-back method, the product
recovery mechanism and performance goal, the product design goal, and
the enforcement mechanism. These are key strategies to EPR programs,
and decisions about them can affect the efficacy of the program. While
this list is not exhaustive, it includes those concepts that are arguably
most important in crafting successful EPR laws.
1.

Product Selection Mechanisms

The first strategy that will be explored is the mechanism by which
states select the products to be regulated under the states’ EPR laws.
There are two different means of determining which products to regulate:
1. a separate EPR law that is enacted by the legislature to target each
particular product (the “product-by-product” approach), and 2. an EPR
105

Sachs, supra note 26, at 75.
One major alternative to the take-back EPR policy approach is the use of advanced
recovery fees (ARFs). An ARF is an extra fee that the consumer pays to the retailer for a particular
product, such as an electronic good, at the time of purchase; the retailer then forwards the fee to the
governmental authority or other organization that is responsible for the collection, recycling, and
resource recovery of that product. NW. PROD. STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, FRONT-END FINANCING
(FEF) SCENARIOS FOR COLLECTION/RECYCLING OF ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS 2 (2004), available at
productstewardship.net/PDFs/productsElectronicsFinancingScenarios.pdf. The chief concern with
ARFs, however, is that the producer and the incentive for sustainable product redesign are
completely absent from the equation. Id. at 3. Therefore, if the goal is sustainable product redesign
(as it is with EPR and zero waste policies), it is the producer that should bear the responsibility of
taking back and managing products at the end of life.
107
See Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 482 (2010).
106
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law that institutes a framework mechanism under which the state relies
upon a specific set of criteria and factors when determining which
products to regulate under its EPR program. 108 The latter framework
approach has two variations: the “framework/legislature” approach and
the “framework/agency” approach.
The product-by-product approach involves the state’s legislature
passing an entirely new law for each product to be regulated under an
EPR take-back program. Historically, in the United States, the general
process behind state EPR legislation has reflected a product-by-product
approach: whenever a state chooses to regulate a particular product or
product category, it will enact an entirely new statute for that single
product or product category. 109 Over the years, some states have
established several EPR laws. California and Maine, for example, each
have six EPR laws for six separate products; Vermont has five; Maryland
has four; and Illinois, Iowa, New Jersey, and Rhode Island each have
three. 110
The obvious concern with the traditional, product-by-product
approach is that each time a state determines that a particular product
needs to be regulated under the state’s EPR program, it must pass new
legislation. As with any piece of legislation, the bill must be passed by
both chambers of the legislature and then signed by the governor.
Throughout the political process, the bill must navigate the mounting
pressures from special interest and lobbyist groups aimed at defeating the
bill. The result is a tedious, drawn-out, and inefficient process.
An EPR framework law differs from the product-by-product
approach because instead of passing a new law for each product to be
regulated, a framework law gives the state the ability to address multiple
products under one law based on a set of criteria or factors. 111 The
criteria used to recommend or select products generally include whether
regulating the product has the potential to reduce waste, toxicity,
greenhouse gas emissions, or other environmental or health impacts; the
potential to encourage product redesign or manufacture that reduces
environmental or health impacts; the public demand or need for
improved recycling, reuse, or disposal practices; the potential to increase
recovery of materials for reuse and recycling; the potential to reduce the
costs of waste management to local governments and taxpayers; and the
success in regulating the product in similar programs in other states or

108

See
EPR/Product
Stewardship
Q&A,
PROD.
POLICY
INST.,
www.productpolicy.org/content/eprproduct-stewardship-q#framework (last visited Sept. 30, 2012).
109
See Prod. Policy Inst., supra note 9.
110
PROD. STEWARDSHIP INST., supra note 8.
111
PROD. POLICY INST., supra note 108.
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countries. 112 A new chapter in state EPR law began in 2010 when Maine
passed the nation’s first EPR framework law. 113 Following Maine’s lead,
eight states have introduced EPR framework bills in their legislature:
California, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Washington. 114 As of January 2013, none of these bills has
passed to become law. 115
These framework laws can take two different approaches. Under the
first, the “framework/legislature” approach, the state agency uses
established selection criteria and factors to recommend to the legislature
those products that should be regulated, which are then included in new
legislation if the legislature accepts the recommendations. 116 Under the
second approach, the “framework/agency” approach, the named state
agency uses the selection criteria and factors to determine, through a
public process, those products that are to be regulated under an EPR
program. 117 The key difference is that the former approach vests the
ultimate decision-making authority with the state legislature and the
legislative process, while the latter approach vests the decision-making
authority with the named state agency and the regulatory process.
2.

Individual Versus Collective Take-Back

The next EPR concept, the degree of cooperation or responsibility
among producers for taking back their products, is crucial in determining
the effectiveness of EPR laws in achieving product redesign. Only those
EPR laws that require individual producer responsibility, as opposed to
collective responsibility, will create true cost internalization and
subsequent product redesign. 118 Thus, EPR regulatory regimes can, and
should, call for individual producer responsibility, under which a
producer is individually responsible for the take-back and end-of-life
management of its products.
112

See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1772 (Westlaw 2013); A. 6293, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2011); H.B. 2017, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2011); H.B. 3060, 75th Leg. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Or. 2009); S. 2027, 2012 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2012).
113
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 1771-1775; see also Press Release, Prod. Policy Inst.,
supra note 9.
114
A.B. 2139, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010); Mass. H.B. 2017; H.F. 2407, 86th Sess.
(Minn. 2009); N.Y. A. 6293; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027; H. 696, 2009-2010 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2010);
H.B. 1718, 61st Leg., 2009 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009).
115
PROD. STEWARDSHIP INST., supra note 8.
116
See Maine’s framework law and the recent framework bills introduced in California,
Minnesota, New York, and Vermont: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 1771-1775; Cal. A.B. 2139;
Minn. H.F. 2407; N.Y. A. 6293; Vt. H. 696.
117
See the recent framework bills introduced in Massachusetts, Oregon, and Rhode Island:
Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027 .
118
See Sachs, supra note 26, at 75-76; VAN ROSSEM ET AL., supra note 99, at 6.
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However, there are EPR laws and bills that give producers or
manufacturers the option of whether to be individually or collectively
responsible for end-of-life product management. 119 While not as
effective as individual producer responsibility, this approach may be a
suitable one, as the International Institute for Industrial Environmental
Economics concluded in its report: “The fact that EPR law is meant to be
goal-oriented . . . suggests that producers should be allowed to
collectively organize . . . take-back and recycling systems. In fact, in
many cases it may be rational to do so from both an economic and
environmental perspective.” 120 If producers are given the option and
elect to collectively organize, it will be necessary for producers to
maintain individual financial responsibility for their new products in
order to ensure proper cost internalization and product redesign. 121 The
focus is on a producer’s new products because the design of old products
cannot be changed retroactively and thus cost internalization is not as
vital for those products. 122
3.

Product Recovery Mechanisms and Performance Goals

Under an EPR take-back program, a potential problem is that the
disposal of waste in landfills and incinerators will continue to occur and
the responsibility for disposal will only be shifted to the producers. Such
an outcome would fail to achieve the waste diversion and resource
conservation goals. The solution is to include within an EPR law two
related components: a product recovery mechanism and performance
goals. Both of these pieces are necessary, because without mandatory
reuse and recycling provisions or performance goals there would be
almost no benefit from requiring producers to take back the products if
they are ultimately to be landfilled or incinerated. 123
The product recovery mechanism is a mandate that all discarded
products collected by the producer be reused or recycled by the
producer. 124 In some of the new EPR framework bills these mandates fall
within the producers’ prescribed product stewardship programs. 125 These
EPR framework bills also contain a narrow exception that allows

119

See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1672; Mass. H.B. 2017; Minn. H.F. 2407; N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 149-M:58-a (Westlaw 2013); Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027; Vt. H. 696.
120
VAN ROSSEM ET AL., supra note 99, at 25.
121
Id. at 7.
122
Id. at 7.
123
See Sachs, supra note 26, at 80.
124
See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 42970-42983 (Westlaw 2013); Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B.
3060; R.I. S. 2027.
125
See Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027.
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products to be properly “disposed” only if the “applicable productspecific rule” promulgated by the state so permits. 126 However, this
exception is largely insignificant in light of EPR goals, because the focus
is first on reusing and recycling the product, and disposal may occur only
if the agency allows.
Related to the product recovery mandate are enforceable
performance goals, which are “metrics established by the producer or the
state to measure on an annual basis the performance of a product
stewardship program in addressing recycling, reuse, safe disposal,
environmental impacts or health impacts related to a product.” 127
Producers must include these goals within their product stewardship
plans, which are submitted to the state for approval and must include the
total amount collected, the collection rate, and the disposition rate. 128
These goals will be measured annually and will be enforced by the state;
producers who violate them will be subject to significant civil
penalties. 129
4.

Product Design Goals

Another important EPR concept is the inclusion of mechanisms to
prompt sustainable product redesign either through voluntary “product
goals” or mandated consideration of design changes. These mechanisms
prompt producers to consider design and manufacturing changes by
either allowing or requiring them to adopt product goals. These
mechanisms are a new concept in EPR laws in the United States, and
they have been included in the EPR framework bills introduced in the
last few years. 130 While most pre-existing EPR laws in the United States
include the foundational take-back element of the EPR doctrine—leading
to cost internalization and subsequent redesign—they do not include
express provisions aimed specifically at triggering product redesign.
Some of the recent EPR framework bills include a provision that allows
producers to establish voluntary product goals, typically defined as “any
change in the design and manufacture of a product that reduces or has the
potential to reduce environmental or health impacts.” 131 Moreover, if a
producer does adopt product goals, it must include them in its product
126
127

Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027.
Cal. A.B. 2139, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010); Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I.

S. 2027.
128

Cal. A.B. 2139; Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027.
See, e.g., Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027.
130
Cal. A.B. 2139; Mass. H.B. 2017; H.F. 2407, 86th Sess. (Minn. 2009); Or. H.B. 3060; R.I.
S. 2027.
131
Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027; see also Cal. A.B. 2139.
129
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stewardship plan submitted to the state. 132
Other recent EPR framework bills employ a more direct approach in
prompting design changes. Although some framework bills merely
permit producers to develop voluntary product redesign goals,
California’s bill appears to require producers to adopt product goals that
address “the use of virgin material . . . , the impact upon, or use of, water
or energy by the covered product, the use of, or generation of hazardous
substances by the covered product, the carbon footprint . . . , the . . .
product’s longevity, the recycled content of the . . . product, and [its]
recyclability.” 133 Additionally, California’s bill mandates that a
producer’s product stewardship plan “address the environmental impacts
of the covered product over the entire life-cycle of that product,
including the product design [and] manufacture.” 134 Similarly,
Minnesota’s bill also states that a producer’s product stewardship plan
must include “product design changes that will be considered to reduce
toxicity, water use, or energy use or to increase recycled content,
recyclability, or product longevity.” 135
In both approaches, it is the producers that determine what the goals
or changes will be. In either instance, if or when product goals are
adopted, they are not enforceable and there is no requirement that
producers achieve the goals. 136 This lack of enforceability, however,
further encourages producers to freely consider and implement design
changes without the danger of incurring penalties if producers fail to
meet their goals.
5.

Enforcement and Penalty Mechanisms

The last major components of EPR laws are enforcement and
penalty mechanisms, which ensure that producers will comply with a
state’s EPR program. Generally, a producer and a retailer are not allowed
to sell or distribute a regulated product unless the producer has submitted
a product stewardship plan 137 or participates in an approved product
stewardship program for that product. 138 Moreover, to enforce these
provisions, EPR laws can impose penalties for violations. Penalty

132

Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027.
Cal. A.B. 2139.
134
Id.
135
Minn. H.F. 2407.
136
See, e.g., Cal. A.B. 2139; Mass. H.B. 2017; Minn. H.F. 2407; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027.
137
See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 42974(b) (Westlaw 2013); Cal. A.B. 2139; Mass. H.B.
133

2017.
138

See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 149-M:58-a(IV) (Westlaw 2013); Minn. H.F. 2407; Or.
H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027; H. 696, 2009-2010 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2010).
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provisions can be broad, covering any violation of the statute by any
person, and range from $1,000 to $25,000 for each day the violation
continues or for each violation. 139 Alternatively, penalty provisions can
be much more narrow and specifically target producers and or retailers.
In these latter types of penalty provisions, a producer can be fined for
each day it is not participating in an approved product stewardship
program covering the product, or for not implementing an approved
product stewardship plan. 140 In addition, retailers can be fined for
continuing to sell a product from a producer who is not participating in a
product stewardship program or otherwise not in compliance with the
EPR statute. 141
V.

A SOUND EPR LAW, ITS CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES AND A
FEDERAL ALTERNATIVE

The political environment is changing with respect to EPR
legislation. More states are now regulating more products through the
product-by-product approach discussed earlier. 142 In addition, EPR
framework laws are gaining traction, with the enactment of Maine’s firstin-the-nation framework law and the introduction of eight more
framework bills since then. 143 This Part recommends which concepts and
mechanisms should be included to create an ideal framework law. This
Part will also address potential constitutional hurdles to such EPR laws
and will consider national EPR legislation as an alternative to the current
state-by-state approach.
A.

THE IDEAL EPR FRAMEWORK

In order to achieve the immediate goals of closing the gap on the
remaining amount of MSW still being landfilled or incinerated,
conserving natural resources, and prompting product redesign, states
should enact EPR framework laws instead of relying on the traditional
product-by-product approach. Framework laws can serve as a more
efficient and effective way of including all those products in the waste
stream that cannot be recycled, composted, or reused through current
municipal efforts.
Though states should follow Maine’s general efforts, they should
not model their framework laws too closely on Maine’s approach.
139

See, e.g., Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027.
See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 42978; Cal. A.B. 2139; Minn. H.F. 2407; Vt. H. 696.
141
See, e.g., Minn. H.F. 2407; Vt. H. 696.
142
See PROD. STEWARDSHIP INST., supra note 8; PROD. STEWARDSHIP INST., supra note 94.
143
See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 1771-1775 (Westlaw 2013).
140
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Maine’s three-page framework bill 144 presents the bare minimum of an
EPR framework law. Moreover, Maine’s law does not differ much from
the traditional product-by-product approach logistically because it still
requires the legislature to pass a new law for each new product to be
regulated under its framework law. 145 In moving forward, states should
design their EPR framework laws to include all the concepts and
mechanisms previously discussed. Some state framework bills have
already included many of those mechanisms, but none of the bills are
drafted in such a way as to achieve complete zero waste.
First, in regard to product selection mechanisms, states should use
the framework/agency approach, under which a set of criteria or factors,
established by the state’s legislature, are used by a designated state
agency to recommend products for inclusion in a product stewardship
program, and the state agency makes the ultimate determination of which
products will be regulated. 146 This approach significantly limits
inefficiency and delay inherent in the framework/legislature and productby-product approaches. Agencies tasked with identifying those products
requiring EPR can act in a more timely and efficient manner than state
legislatures. Furthermore, the framework/legislative and product-byproduct approaches will lead to the regulation of fewer products and
delay expanded implementation of EPR. 147
Although this approach vests the agency with the decision-making
authority, the agency does not make the decision independently. Those
new framework bills that utilize the framework/agency approach require
that the public be involved throughout the product selection process, with
the opportunity for written comments to be given and at least one public
hearing to be held. 148 In addition, the agency must create and seek
guidance from an advisory committee, composed of members
representing producers, local government, environmental groups, the
solid waste or recycling industry, and the retail industry. 149 These
elements will work to ensure that an open, public process is used, which
will be vital to maintain accountability, given that unelected agency
officials rather than the elected representatives in the legislature will be
deciding which products to regulate.
Second, with respect to the type of take-back mechanism used, there
144

2010 Me. Legis. Serv. Ch. 516 (H.P. 1159) (L.D. 1631) (Westlaw 2013).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 1772(2), 1773.
146
See, e.g., H.B. 2017, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2011); H.B. 3060, 75th Leg. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); S. 2027, 2012 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2012).
147
See, e.g., A.B. 2139, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010); H.F. 2407, 86th Sess. (Minn.
2009); H. 696, 2009-2010 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2010).
148
Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027.
149
Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027.
145
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are two options states can follow: states should design their framework
laws to achieve individual producer take-back and responsibility or allow
for collective take-back that still requires producers to bear individual
financial responsibility for new products. In order to achieve cost
internalization and encourage product redesign, producers must have
individual rather than collective responsibility over their products. 150
However, most of the framework bills introduced in the last few years
give producers the option to collectively organize in taking back and
managing their products. 151 Arguably, because individual take-back and
responsibility leads to greater cost internalization by the producers,
producers will likely opt to collectively organize, which could lead to the
problems that Professor Sachs discusses in his Article. 152 Nonetheless,
giving producers the option may be sufficient; so long as producers
maintain individual financial responsibility over their new products while
undertaking collective responsibility over their old products, the true
product costs should still be internalized. 153
A third, related element that has been included in some of the recent
bills is the product goal defined as an adopted change in the design and
manufacture of a product to increase the sustainability of that product.
States should look to including this mechanism in their EPR framework
laws because this tool may be effective enough to supplement any
potential lack of cost internalization arising from producers opting for
collective responsibility. Many of the new framework bills include this
element in an effort to encourage producers to voluntarily reexamine
their products’ design and manufacturing processes and reduce the
associated environmental impacts of the products. 154 Provisions that
require a producer to address the environmental impacts of the product’s
design and manufacturing process and include product goals aimed at
reducing the product’s adverse impacts will have a greater likelihood of
achieving product redesign, and thus states should include a mandatory
product goal provision. 155 Such a provision will likely serve as a safety
net and ensure that product redesign will occur in the event that cost
internalization fails to bring about such change.
Fourth, with respect to product recovery mechanisms and
performance goals, states must include both of these EPR policy tools in
150
151

See Sachs, supra note 26, at 75-76; VAN ROSSEM ET AL., supra note 99, at 6.
See Cal. A.B. 2139; Mass. H.B. 2017; Minn. H.F. 2407; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027; Vt.

H. 696.
152

Sachs, supra note 26, at 75-76.
Id.
154
See Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027.
155
See Cal. A.B. 2139; see also Minn. H.F. 2407 (requiring producers to include in the
product stewardship plan product design changes that will be considered by the producer).
153
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order to maximize waste diversion and resource conservation. These
reuse and recycling mandates and performance goals will conserve
limited resources and help make certain that regulated products do not
end up in landfills or incinerators. Without such provisions, producers
could simply landfill or incinerate the collected products and there would
be no point to requiring product take-back. 156 The performance goals,
which will generally be set by the producers and enforced by the state,
are another means of creating producer accountability and will work to
ensure that producers actually engage in resource recovery. In addition,
such performance goals should increase over time, perhaps annually or
every two years, thereby acting as a technology-forcing mechanism and
leading to more sustainable product design and manufacturing processes.
Furthermore, mandated recovery, reuse, and recycling provisions and
goals will work to increase the costs that producers must face. Under the
current framework bills, a producer would be required to reuse or recycle
the product in its entirety unless the state grants an exemption. Thus, in
light of these added costs, such provisions should further prompt product
redesign.
Lastly, in order to ensure that producers comply with these
important provisions and mechanisms, state framework legislation
should have enforcement and penalty provisions. Framework laws
should prohibit a producer (and retailers) from selling or distributing a
regulated product unless the producer has submitted a product
stewardship plan for that product 157 or participates in an approved
product stewardship program for that product. Moreover, penalty
provisions should be drafted broadly to include any violation of the
statute by any person.
While a framework law with these recommended provisions should
be able to significantly advance the zero waste and EPR goals discussed
earlier, simply adopting a framework law with these components will not
suffice. A hybrid approach should be pursued. In addition to such a
framework law, cities, counties, and states should look to adopting a
mandatory recycling and composting ordinance or law, like that of San
Francisco, 158 which is arguably the biggest, if not the sole, reason for its
current seventy-seven percent diversion rate. Accordingly, once an
adequate EPR framework law has been established, it will be necessary
to then target those products that are still being landfilled and incinerated

156

See Sachs, supra note 26, at 80.
See Mass. H.B. 2017; Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027. Product stewardship plans describe the
producer’s program for collection; recycling, reuse, or disposal of products; and any related
performance or product goals.
158
See S. F., Cal., Ordinance 100-09 (June 9, 2009).
157
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or not already regulated under the existing EPR laws.
B.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE EPR LAWS

EPR laws have yet to face significant legal challenge. But as the
number and complexity of EPR laws expand, regulated producers will
predictably raise constitutional challenges under the Equal Protection
Clause and Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 159 A welldesigned EPR law, however, should be able to withstand such
constitutional scrutiny. 160
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that “no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.” 161 The U.S. Supreme Court has construed
the Equal Protection Clause as prohibiting government action that
involves irrational classifications. 162 Because EPR laws will differentiate
between products—imposing end-of-life responsibility on the producers
of some products, but not others—they must withstand rational-basis
review (as opposed to intermediate or strict-scrutiny review because
producers are not a protected class entitled to heightened scrutiny).
The rational-basis test would be used to determine whether state
laws regulating goods and products violate the Equal Protection Clause
and presents a fairly low burden. 163 So long as “the question is at least
debatable” and “there was evidence before the legislature reasonably
supporting the classification,” such challenges to state laws cannot
succeed. 164 A state would have a myriad of rational bases for creating an
EPR law, such as conserving valuable natural resources; protecting the
159

While an EPR law may raise substantive due process issues as well, challenges on this
basis would likely fail, given the extremely low burden required to uphold the law and the great
deference afforded to the government. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that the State may not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Substantive due process focuses on whether the government
has an adequate basis for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. See IRWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 603 (3d ed. 2009). Since 1937, no state or federal law has been held to
violate the Constitution on economic substantive due process grounds. Irwin Chemerinsky explains:
“The [Supreme] Court has made it clear that economic regulations . . . will be upheld when
challenged under the Due Process Clause so long as they are rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose. The government’s purpose can be any goal not prohibited by the Constitution.
In fact, it does not need to be proven that the asserted purpose was the legislature’s actual objective.
Any conceivable purpose is sufficient.” Id. at 628.
160
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
161
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
162
City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (“The State may
not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the
distinction arbitrary or irrational.”).
163
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 (1981).
164
Id. at 464.
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environment from air, water, and soil pollution; and improving the public
health by moving away from landfilling and incineration toward
recycling, composting, and product take-back. Therefore, in light of the
low rational-basis threshold and the significant likelihood that the state
would have a legitimate interest in its EPR law that is rationally related
to the state’s goals, any Equal Protection Clause challenge against a state
EPR law would most likely be unsuccessful. 165
The Commerce Clause also has the potential to obstruct EPR laws.
The Commerce Clause grants to Congress the power “[t]o regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States.” 166 It has long been established
that even in the absence of Congress exercising this power, the
Commerce Clause prevents states from creating statutes or regulations
that unreasonably burden interstate commerce. 167 This restriction on the
states’ authority is known as the “dormant Commerce Clause.” 168
Because EPR laws require producers to bear physical and financial
responsibility of certain products at the end of their lives, and thus
increase costs of production, such laws could conceivably impose
burdens on interstate commerce.
The process for determining whether a state statute or regulation
violates the dormant Commerce Clause involves a two-step analysis: 1)
the court must determine whether “a state statute directly regulates or
discriminates against interstate commerce, or [whether] its effect is to
favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests,” and 2) “if
the state regulation is neither discriminatory nor extraterritorial, then the
court must apply the balancing test set forth in Pike [v. Bruce Church,
Inc.]” 169 In particular, a state law or regulation is discriminatory if it
“directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when
its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state
interests.” 170 A state law or regulation is extraterritorial, and thus per se
invalid, when it “directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside
the boundaries of [the state].” 171 A statute or regulation that is not
discriminatory or extraterritorial must still pass the Pike balancing test,
which weighs the local benefits against the burden on interstate
165

See id. at 470; Shamrock Farms Co. v. Veneman, 146 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 1998).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
167
Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978); Clover Leaf Creamery,
449 U.S. at 470-71.
168
See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 644 (6th Cir. 2010).
169
Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 700 F.3d 796, 803-04 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 471; Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324,
336, 340-41 (1989); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
170
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986); see
also Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 803.
171
Healy, 491 U.S. at 336; Boggs, 622 F.3d at 645.
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commerce: “Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are
only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits.” 172
While there have been no cases expressly determining the
constitutionality of a state EPR law, there have been decisions dealing
with related laws regulating goods and products, such as product labeling
restrictions, 173 packaging bans, 174 and various size and body regulations
for tractor-trailers. 175 Their discussion and analysis lend themselves to
determining the potential outcome for EPR laws.
In a string of decisions over four decades, the U.S. Supreme Court
analyzed whether a state can regulate the size or certain body
specifications of tractor-trailers involved in interstate transport. The
Court ultimately concluded that despite a state’s “broad” and “pervasive”
power to regulate the use of its highways, as well as the great deference
afforded to states in regulating local safety, a state may not regulate
trailer design or require the use of certain mudguards for tractor-trailers,
nor may it regulate the length of tractor-trailers, if the resulting burdens
on interstate commerce clearly exceed the local benefits. 176 The Court’s
decisions turned on the principle that state laws should not be
inconsistent with most or almost all of the other similarly situated states’
regulations. 177
The Supreme Court has also upheld a state ban on the use of certain
packaging despite the fact that in-state producers would benefit and outof-state producers would be burdened. 178 The purpose of the state ban
was to conserve natural resources and energy and to ease solid waste

172

Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001); Boggs, 622 F.3d at 628;
Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 800.
174
Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 456.
175
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 521-23 (1959); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc.
v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
176
Bibb, 359 U.S. at 528-29; Raymond Motor Transp., 434 U.S. at 447-48; Kassel, 450 U.S.
at 671. But see S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 196 (1938) (“It
plainly cannot be said that the width of trucks used on the highways in South Carolina is unrelated to
their safety and cost of maintenance, or that a 90-inch width limitation, adopted to safeguard the
highways of the state, is not within the range of the permissible legislative choice.”).
177
Bibb, 359 U.S. at 526, 529-30 (“A State which insists on a design out of line with the
requirements of almost all the other States may sometimes place a great burden of delay and
inconvenience on those interstate motor carriers entering or crossing its territory.”); Kassel, 450 U.S.
at 671 (“Iowa’s law is now out of step with the laws of all other Midwestern and Western States.
Iowa thus substantially burdens the interstate flow of goods by truck.”).
178
Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 458, 472-73.
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disposal problems. 179 The Court concluded that the law was not
discriminatory and, further, that any incidental burden on interstate
commerce was not clearly excessive in light of the state’s environmental
and waste management interests. 180
Lastly, there have been several cases involving challenges to state
product labeling requirements for goods, such as mercury-containing
products, 181 milk products, 182 and beverage containers. 183 In these cases,
the primary issue was whether the state laws were extraterritorial and
thus per se invalid. In concluding that the laws were not extraterritorial,
the courts focused on the fact that these state labeling laws had no
bearing on how the manufacturers were required to label the same
products in other states. 184 Moreover, in response to one challenger’s
argument that the law exposed it to the possibility of multiple labeling
standards, one court simply held that there needed to be an actual conflict
between competing regulations before either would be found invalid. 185
A state EPR law would most likely not be invalid per se as long as
the law applied to all producers of that regulated product and is drafted
in such a way that it does not directly control conduct completely outside
the state’s borders. All of the recent EPR framework bills apply evenhandedly to all persons who manufacture, import, or own the name,
brand, or license of a product that is sold or distributed within the
relevant state. 186 Thus, there is no distinction between in-state and outof-state producers. Additionally, these laws have no bearing on how
producers of regulated products are to manage those same end-of-life
products upon disposal in other states. 187 Therefore, because state EPR
laws would likely not be deemed discriminatory or extraterritorial, the
focus would likely be on whether the burden imposed on interstate
179

Id. at 458.
Id. at 471-73. The Ninth Circuit has also addressed a Commerce Clause challenge to a
California law that governed the composition of consumer milk. Shamrock Farms Co. v. Veneman,
146 F.3d 1177, 1178 (9th Cir. 1998). However, the analysis and outcome are not helpful in
determining the constitutionality of an EPR law because Congress had immunized the state’s law
from Commerce Clause challenges, which it had authority to do. Id. at 1180. Thus, although the
court held that the state law did not violate the Commerce Clause, the court did not address the
ultimate issue of whether the law overburdened interstate commerce. Id. at 1179-81.
181
Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 2001).
182
Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 632-33 (6th Cir. 2010).
183
Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 700 F.3d 796, 800 (6th Cir. 2012).
184
Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 110; Boggs, 622 F.3d at 647. But see Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at
810.
185
Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 112.
186
A.B. 2139, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010); H.B. 2017, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass.
2011); H.F. 2407, 86th Sess. (Minn. 2009); H.B. 3060, 75th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); S.
2027, 2012 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2012); H. 696, 2009-2010 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2010).
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See Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 110; Boggs, 622 F.3d at 647.
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commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits.
In light of the above cases, particularly those dealing with tractortrailer regulations and product labeling, arguments could be made that a
state EPR law runs afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause. Challengers
to a state EPR law could potentially argue that differing state EPR
standards and requirements would result in producers having to comply
with multiple and possibly conflicting regulatory regimes. Thus, the laws
would impose an excessive burden on interstate commerce. This
“conflicting regulatory regimes” analysis was the primary rationale for
the Supreme Court striking down state laws regulating the size and
mudguard specifications of tractor-trailers that deviated substantially
from surrounding states’ regulations. 188 Challengers to state labeling
standards made the same argument, but the Second Circuit held that “[i]t
is not enough to point to a risk of conflicting regulatory regimes in
multiple states; there must be an actual conflict between the challenged
regulation and those in place in other states.” 189
Here, however, current state EPR laws utilize the same basic takeback requirements and resource recovery mandates, and thus do not
conflict. Even when there are differences, they are merely minor
deviations and do not result in drastic differences that would amount to
the complete halting of the movement of goods across state lines.
Moreover, most of the new EPR framework bills include provisions that
require the state to consult and coordinate with other states in order to
achieve consistency in the development and implementation of the
product stewardship system, 190 look to those products regulated under a
product stewardship program in other states when determining which
products to regulate, 191 or encourage the inclusion and participation of
other states when selecting products to regulate under a product
stewardship program. 192
Under the Pike balancing test, once a legitimate local purpose is
found, “the question becomes one of degree,” and courts will look to
whether the local interest “could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.” 193 Waste management has traditionally
been a state and local government function, and therefore courts are
reluctant to infringe upon this authority. 194 In addition, conservation of
188

Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981); Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1959).
189
Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 112.
190
Or. H.B. 3060; R.I. S. 2027.
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Cal. A.B. 2139.
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H.B. 2017, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2011).
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Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
194
United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344
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natural resources and energy and alleviating waste disposal issues have
been recognized as legitimate, substantial state interests. 195 Thus, there is
already a strong presumption in the validity of a state EPR law, the
purpose of which is to promote better waste management solutions and
reduce the burden on natural resources extraction. While there very well
may be a modicum of burden imposed on interstate commerce, existing
case law supports the conclusion that such burden is not “clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” 196
C.

NATIONAL EPR LEGISLATION

An alternative to a state EPR framework law is national EPR
legislation. There is currently no federal regulatory system directly
governing MSW reduction or generation. 197 Although RCRA addresses
solid and hazardous waste disposal, this law is aimed at providing
guidelines and minimum compliance standards while deferring to state
and local solid waste regulatory authority. 198 A national EPR law would
arguably be more efficient than fifty separate state laws. Many in the
manufacturing industry would prefer a single, uniform EPR approach,
claiming that the current patchwork of state EPR laws is too costly. 199 In
addition, a federal law would sidestep the constitutionality issues
discussed above, allowing the federal government to take a more
command-and-control approach with respect to directly regulating the
end-of-life management of a product. Such federal legislation could take
at least one of two forms: amending RCRA to include EPR provisions, or
creating an entirely new EPR statute and regulatory regime modeled on
the state law approach. 200
When Congress created RCRA, it declared that our increasing
generation of solid and hazardous waste is creating environmental and
public health impacts and that hazardous waste, in particular, should be

(2007).
195

Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 (1981).
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
197
See McCrea, supra note 89, at 517.
198
RCRA, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6902, 6907, 6941 (Westlaw 2013); see also, RCRA State
Authorization, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, www.epa.gov/osw/laws-regs/state/index.htm (last
updated Nov. 15, 2012).
199
See NAT’L CTR. FOR ELEC. RECYCLING, A STUDY OF THE STATE-BY-STATE E-WASTE
PATCHWORK: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS ECONOMIC AND OTHER EFFECTS ON INDUSTRY, GOVERNMENT
AND CONSUMERS (2006); CHAZ MILLER, NAT’L SOLID WASTES MGMT. ASS’N, FROM BIRTH TO
REBIRTH: WILL PRODUCT STEWARDSHIP SAVE RESOURCES? 9, ABA Section of Environment,
Energy, and Resources Section Fall Meeting, Oct. 2011.
200
See McCrea, supra note 89, at 527.
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reduced or eliminated. 201 Therefore, amending RCRA to include EPR
provisions would be consistent with the Act’s underlying purpose. While
the federal government cannot legally require states to legislate a certain
way, 202 it can incentivize states to take legislative action by
unambiguously conditioning the receipt of federal funds on compliance
with federal statutory directives that are related to the purpose of the
funds. 203
RCRA already ties federal grants to the approval of states’ solid
waste management plans and provides for minimum criteria that must be
included in a plan for it to be approved. 204 Therefore, amending RCRA
would not have to be very drastic and could maintain the current
regulatory practice in place, under which states carry out waste
management practices through the development of approved state
management plans. Such an amendment could simply change the
statutory and regulatory requirements for the approval of state
management plans 205 by mandating that such plans provide for the
development of EPR framework programs. In fact, federal regulations
are already moving in this direction by requiring that state plans “provide
for a policy and strategy for encouragement of resource recovery and
conservation activities” 206 and recommending that states “encourage the
development of resource recovery and resource conservation facilities
and practices as the preferred means of solid waste management.” 207
These regulations could be augmented to require more than mere
“encouragement” and to address specific EPR practices. In addition, by
amending the state plan criteria, the federal government can specify what
the product stewardship programs must include in order to obtain federal
approval, thereby ensuring a more uniform and consistent EPR policy.
As an alternative to RCRA amendment, an entirely new federal
law—a “Product Stewardship Act”—could be passed to address EPR.
Such a law should include all those recommended concepts and
mechanisms discussed earlier and could be modeled on the Consumer
Product Safety Act, which was passed to protect the public from
unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products through
the development of uniform safety standards. 208 Under the proposed
“Product Stewardship Act,” a Product Stewardship Commission would
201

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901, 6902 (Westlaw 2013).
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).
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be created and would be granted the authority of determining which
products to regulate, prescribing resource recovery standards and
performance and product goals, and enforcing the provisions of the
statute.
Such a new federal law would likely result in preemption of current
state EPR laws in order to maximize regulatory efficiency. In fact, some
of the recent state framework bills contemplate the possibility of a
stricter federal law by requiring the state to evaluate such federal law to
determine if it meets or exceeds the requirements of the state’s law and
to provide a report to the state’s legislature. 209 One way to alleviate any
potential for state opposition and ensure a smooth transition to a national
regulatory regime would be to allow state EPR laws to remain in place
for those products that the federal law is not yet regulating.
While a federal EPR law is preferable to fifty individual state laws,
federal EPR legislation does not appear to be coming anytime soon. Such
proposed legislation would also likely face stiff opposition from wellfunded and powerful lobbying groups such as the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America,
and the National Electrical Manufacturers Association. But state EPR
laws have confronted oppositional lobbying efforts as well. 210 In light of
how far away a federal EPR law is and the uphill battle proponents will
face in passing one, states should continue passing their own framework
laws in the interim. Such continued and diverse state efforts will only
build momentum for a federal law and lead to better regulation that
further protects the environment, its natural resources, and the public
from the significant, adverse effects caused by our status quo waste
management practices.
VI. CONCLUSION
The numerous adverse environmental and public health effects that
stem from our current waste management practices have prompted cities,
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e.g., Tim Faulkner, Lobbyists Invade Producer Responsibility Hearing, ECORI NEWS (Apr. 12,
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counties, and states to enact new innovative policies. Two of these
policies, zero waste and EPR, are designed to change the way in which
waste is ultimately managed and are aimed at achieving, among other
things, complete waste diversion from landfills and incinerators, resource
conservation, and sustainable product redesign.
Current zero waste policies around the country appear to be focused
purely on waste diversion using recycling, composting, and reuse efforts.
While these practices are laudable and necessary, they are not enough to
achieve true zero waste goals. In addition, localities or states should
enact laws mandating recycling and composting, resulting in resource
recovery to the greatest extent practicable. Still, even with these efforts
in place, complete waste diversion would not be achieved and the larger
problem of sustainable product design and manufacturing would
similarly not be addressed.
To fully achieve these goals, a state EPR framework law should be
in place to require producers of those products still in the waste stream to
take them back and manage them. The law must be a “framework” law
that gives the state’s designated agency the ultimate authority for
targeting those products that present waste management, environmental,
and public health issues. Moreover, an effective EPR framework law
must have provisions requiring the producer to reuse and recycle the
product and to consider design and manufacture changes of the product.
Though a federal EPR law that includes these same or similar
provisions is preferred to a patchwork of state laws, a national regulatory
regime is still too far away. Therefore, it is imperative that states
continue to work in crafting framework legislation that would address, in
product stewardship programs, those products presenting persistent waste
management, environmental, and public health issues.
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